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The Reality of Curtiss-Wright
ANTHONY SIMONES*

INTRODUCTION

In 1995 President Bill Clinton clashed with Congress on any number
of questions relating to Bosnia, from the lifting of an arms embargo to the
commitment of U.S. forces. Ironically, he found himself in the same
position as a number of his Republican predecessors: battling Congress to
determine the course of our national security policy. Like those who came
before him, President Clinton has at his disposal extraordinary constitutional
resources that provide him with the means by which to prevail. This article
will examine one of those resources in the Court's decision in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'
Professor Corwin wrote that the Constitution "is an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy. ''2 The
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Constitution and establishing the rules for
this struggle, has tilted the field in favor of the president. The precedent the
Court has consistently employed to justify its decisions is United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.3 The consensus among constitutional scholars
on the Curtiss-Wright decision is expressed quite effectively by Michael
Glennon, when he writes that "[Justice] Sutherland's opinion is a muddled
law review article wedged with considerable difficulty between the pages of
the United States Reports."'4 Despite the eloquence and logic of the
arguments put forth by Glennon and his colleagues, judges have utilized
Curtiss-Wright to sanction a broad range of presidential powers.' This
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1. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, 171
(1957).
3. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
4. Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of PresidentialForeign Affairs Power: Little v.
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 13 (1988).
5. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (stating that these powers include a
broad range of implied powers necessary to achieve effectiveness in foreign affairs); United
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article will examine the manner in which the Court has used Curtiss-Wright
to create a president with preeminent powers in the field of national security
affairs.
I. THE DECISION

On May 28, 1934, Congress passed a resolution authorizing President
Roosevelt to prohibit the sale of arms to countries involved in the CHACO
conflict.6 On the same day, Roosevelt issued such a prohibition. The
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, charged with conspiring to violate this
ban by selling machine guns to Bolivia, challenged the constitutionality of
the government's action. 7 The allegation was that Congress had engaged
in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the president. 8 The
Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice George Sutherland, upheld
the delegation, and took the opportunity to put forth his -own theory of
presidential power.
Justice Sutherland framed the issue in the following terms: "[Aissuming (but not deciding) that the challenged delegation, if it were confined
to internal affairs, would be invalid, may it nevertheless be sustained on the
ground that its exclusive aim is to afford a remedy for a hurtful condition
within foreign territory?9
In so doing, Justice Sutherland was able to distinguish between
domestic and foreign affairs, and more importantly, to use that distinction
to support his resolution of the case.
According to Justice Sutherland, "the powers of the federal government
in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or
internal affairs" differed "both in respect of their origin and their nature."1"
The internal powers granted to the government by the Constitution were
taken from the states. When the federal government exercises its power
internally, it is limited to "those specifically enumerated in the Constitution,

States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (asserting freedom exists to disregard the
constitutionally prescribed process for making international agreements); Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. 222 (1984) (stating that there is considerable discretion to interpret, enforce, and even
evade laws which pose obstacles to achieving the President's foreign policy objectives).
6. See generally THE CHACO COMMISSION, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, DISPUTE BETWEEN
BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY (1934); DAVID H. ZOOK, THE CONDUCT OF THE CHACO WAR

(1960).

7. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
8. Id. at 314.
9. Id. at 315.
10. Id.
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and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the
enumerated powers ....,,11
Justice Sutherland questioned the applicability of this limitation to the
exercise of external power. In his view, the power to conduct foreign policy
was not carved from the power possessed by the states, since states never
held this power in the first place. Justice Sutherland's theory was that the
states were not sovereign, because "[a]s a result of the separation from Great
Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty
passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America."' 2
With this passage of sovereignty came the power over foreign affairs. In
fact, according to Justice Sutherland, the power derived from sovereignty
took precedence over that which was or was not set forth in the Constitution. Justice Sutherland noted:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.' 3
Interestingly, while one of the attributes of sovereignty is the vesting of the
federal government with enormous power over external affairs, Justice
Sutherland contended that "participation in the exercise of the power is
significantly limited."' 4 He then bestowed responsibility for exercising this
power upon the president.' 5 Citing historical precedent and the importance
of the president in the successful conduct of our foreign policy, as well as
John Marshall's identification of the president as "the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations,"' 6 Justice Sutherland referred to "the very
organ of
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
'7
relations."'
international
of
field
the
in
the federal government
Following this lengthy discourse upon the nature of external power,
Justice Sutherland returned to the issue involved in the case, delegation. In
order to maintain an effective foreign policy and avoid "serious embarrass-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 316.
at 318.
at 319.
at 320.
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ment" in the community of nations, Justice Sutherland argued that the
president should be accorded "a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible, were domestic affairs
alone involved."' 8 Thus, Justice Sutherland in effect had it both ways. He
ruled that Congress should be able to delegate power more broadly to the
president in foreign affairs, after indicating that the president probably
already maintained that power through his status as sole organ of the federal
government in international relations.
In his decision, Justice Sutherland presented an accumulation of ideas
which were not only controversial, but contradictory, and thus set himself
up for an onslaught of criticism that has lasted for over half a century.
Many have criticized Justice Sutherland's flawed view of history, 9 in
everything from his notions of sovereignty" to his misrepresentation of
John Marshall's eloquence. 2' Others not only berated Justice Sutherland's
18. Id.
19. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1, 32 (1973). Lofgren thoroughly cataloged Justice
Sutherland's inaccurate and incomplete recollections and recitations of historical events and
concluded "[i]f good history is a requisite to good constitutional law, then Curtiss-Wright
ought to be relegated to history."
20. Entire sections of law review articles have been devoted to establishing that the
states were in fact sovereign prior to the ratification of the Constitution. See David M.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
YALE L. J. 467 (1946). Levitan traced the sovereign nature of the states from the colonial
period through the first and second Continental Congresses and the ratification of the
Declaration of Independence and concluded that Justice Sutherland's understanding of the
passage of sovereignty "does not harmonize with the facts. It simply was not so." Id. at
489; C. Perry Patterson, In re the United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 22 TEX. L.
REV. 445 (1944). Patterson focused on a different time frame, but reached the same
conclusion:
The states declared their own independence and it was acknowledged by
Great Britain in 1783. They retained their sovereignty even when they
confederated in 1781. The state constitutions--their supreme laws-expressed their independence. They acted like independent states. It was
this fact that made the Confederacy a league and doomed it to failure.
They remained independent states until they ratified the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 456.
21. Among the worst of Justice Sutherland's transgressions was the use of John
Marshall's "great argument" in the House of Representatives that "the President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 314. Lofgren points out that Sutherland failed to continue
Marshall's "great argument," which ultimately acknowledged that "Congress, unquestionably,
may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the
contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the
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willingness to expound upon the issue of inherent presidential power in a
case involving the delegation of congressional power,22 but also expressed
indignation at the ease with which Justice Sutherland disregarded the
bedrock principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.23
II. CURTISS-WRIGHT As PRECEDENT
Those reading the literature might reasonably conclude that CurtissWright has been long-since abandoned, tossed into the dust bin of constitutional jurisprudence along with other pariahs such as Dred Scott v.
Sanford24 and Plessy v. Ferguson.2 5 However, for every scholar who
hates Curtiss-Wright,there seems to exist a judge who loves it. As Louis
Henkin wrote over twenty years ago, Curtiss-Wright "remains authoritative
doctrine." 26 Henkin's observation is just as relevant today. Most judges
don't seem to care about the historical basis of Justice Sutherland's theory
and don't recall the specific facts of the case.27 For over half a century the
Supreme Court has looked to Curtiss-Wright for guidance on questions of
presidential power. 21 One approach views Curtiss-Wright as creating a
presidency with the power to transcend the system of checks and balances. 29 A second approach views Curtiss-Wright as creating a presidency

contract by any means it possesses." Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1, 25 (1973). Raoul Berger
went even further, arguing that Justice Sutherland's disingenuous use of this quotation "all
but perverts Marshall's 'sole organ' remark." Raoul Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of
Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1,45 (1972); see also Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF
SHARED POWER 146-147 (1993).

22. Glennon argues that "one is compelled to conclude that the discussion of plenary
power has no place in the Curtiss-Wrightcase since the posture of Congress was support for
the President, not opposition." Michael J.Glennon, Two Views of PresidentialForeign
Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5,13 (1988).
23. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 72 (1990)

(contending that "[b]y denying that the other two branches have a legitimate role in foreign
affairs, the Curtiss-Wright vision rejects the principles of balanced institutional participation
and power sharing that lie at the heart of the National Security Constitution.")
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-26 (1972).
27. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
28. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. 222 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
29. See Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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which, although maintaining fidelity to the separation of powers, ultimately
prevails in virtually any power struggle.30
A. "THE SOLE ORGAN"

The most controversial contention in a very controversial decision was
Justice Sutherland's argument that:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations--a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions in the Constitution. 3'
The argument can be made that in addition to constituting mere dicta,
Justice Sutherland's frequently quoted statement of presidential power
actually says very little. While the president certainly acts as sole organ in
the conduct of our foreign policy Congress will be an equal, if not dominant
force in the formulation of that policy. As Louis Fisher points out, "Only
after the two branches establish national policy does the president operate
as the "sole organ" in implementing national policy." 32 Throughout the
years, however, the Court has taken a different approach to what CurtissWright stands for, frequently interpreting "sole organ" quite literally.33
Just how much power the president would possess under the Court's
interpretation of Curtiss-Wright's "sole organ" edict was demonstrated in
two cases springing from Franklin D. Roosevelt's Litvinov Assignment,34
an executive agreement with the Soviet Union. In United States v.
Belmont,35 decided the year following Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland
was able to build upon his vision of presidential power.36 In upholding the
ability of the president to conclude this international agreement, Belmont
30. See Sale, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); Regan, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Haig, 453
U.S. 280
(1981).
31. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
32. FISHER, supra note 21, at 147.
33. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
34. The information exchange between the American and Soviet governments is set
forth in GENERAL RELATIONS, Nov. 16, 1933, UNITED STATES-USSR, I I BEVANS 1248-58.
35. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
36. Id.
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looked to the president's power as "sole organ."07 The Court viewed this
power as establishing the president's ability to act without the sanction of
Congress, and seemingly his ability to circumvent the constitutional requirement that international agreements be concluded through the treaty
process, with the check provided by Senate ratification." This interpreta-.
tion of Curtiss-Wrightand the president's status as "sole organ" would seem
to allow him to impose his will on the legislative branch, even where the
Senate is specifically provided with a particular role in the text of the
Constitution.
In United States v. Pink,39 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Litvinov Assignment for the second time in a five year span.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion not only cited Curtiss-Wright, but
expanded upon it as Justice Douglas asserted that as the "sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations," the president
would possess additional implied powers, because "effectiveness in handling
the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. '40 As sole
organ, according to Pink, "the powers of the President in the conduct of
foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate, to
determine the public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian
nationalization decrees."'4 The Court in Pink viewed Curtiss-Wright not
only as precedent for the ability of the president to carry out foreign policy
with an executive agreement, but as authority for the president to unilaterally formulate that policy. Pink indicated that Curtiss-Wright's "exclusive
power of the President as sole organ" referred to the principal architect of
national security affairs, rather than a mere channel of communication.4 2
Knauff v. Shaughnessy 43 sheds additional light on what it meant for
the president to function as "sole organ." The Truman Administration,
pursuant to statutory authorization, excluded an alien war bride from the
United States." The Court in Knauff, as it did in Curtiss-Wright, viewed
the statute as a mere starting point. Justice Minton's majority opinion went
on to argue, "[tihe exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty.
The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in

37. Id. at 330.
38. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Ahnost) Always Wins In Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1306-07 (1988).
39. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 229-30.
43. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
44. Id. at 539.
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the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. '4 5 The
precedent cited for this sweeping assertion of "executive power to control"
foreign policy was Curtiss-Wright. The extraordinary language used by the
Court in these cases implies a position of exclusivity for the president in the
making of national security policy.
Even as the nation was expressing its collective dissatisfaction with the
abuses associated with the "Imperial Presidency, 46 of Richard Nixon in the
1970s, members of the Court continued to use Curtiss-Wright to justify their
view of a dominant president. Although the Court rejected the Nixon
Administration's request to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers
in New York Times v. United States,47 Curtiss-Wright appeared in a number
of separate opinions in the case. Justice Harlan, in dissent, cited the "sole
organ" language and observed "[flrom that time, shortly after the founding
of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this
description of executive power., 41 Justice Stewart, concurring, cited
extensively from Curtiss-Wright and asserted it as authority for the
proposition that "the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two
related areas of national defense and international relations .... [a] power
largely unchecked" in our current system of government. 49 The Nixon
Administration would be more successful the next year when it asked the
Court not to follow the act of state doctrine in FirstNational City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba.5° In granting the administration's request, the
Court cited the "sole organ" passage and a line of precedent starting with
Curtiss-Wright as evidence "that this Court has recognized the primacy of
the executive in the conduct of foreign relations . . .
45. Id. at 542. The Court's application of Curtiss-Wright to the issue of aliens in the
early 1950s can best be described as inconsistent. In Knauff, the exclusion of aliens was seen
as an act of sovereignty which Curtiss-Wright dictated was the responsibility of the president.
Two years later the Court looked to Curtiss-Wright as authority for the conclusion that aliens
"remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right
to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders." Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). In another case decided on the very same day the Court
cited Curtiss-Wright to justify its contention that decisions regarding aliens are "exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
589 (1952). Thus, in the space of two years, the Court used Curtiss-Wright as a precedent
for giving responsibility for determining the fate of aliens to the president, then Congress,
and finally the president and Congress working together.
46. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
47. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
48. Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
51. Id. at 766-67.
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By the 1970s, the specific facts that gave rise to Curtiss-Wright faded
from the memory of many judges who sought to use it as a precedent for
presidential domination of national security affairs. Largely forgotten was
Justice Robert Jackson's reminder that Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the
question of the President's power to act without congressional authority, but
the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of
Congress."52 Even when the Court has acknowledged that Curtiss-Wright
involved a delegation of power to Franklin D. Roosevelt, the delegation has
been seen as largely irrelevant, of secondary importance to the power the
president possesses as sole organ to dictate the course of national security
policy. In United States v. Mazurie,53 Curtiss-Wright was cited as authority for the extensive delegation of legislative power "where the entity
exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over
the subject matter. 0 4 While the Mazurie Court acknowledged that a
delegation did occur in Curtiss-Wright, of equal importance was the
president's "independent authority over the subject matter" of foreign
affairs. 55 In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 6 Curtiss-Wright was cited as a case in which the Court
upheld a broad delegation of power "because of the delegatee's residual
authority over particular subjects of regulation. 57
In a footnote in Haig v. Agee 58 the Court stated "we have no occasion
in this case to determine the scope of 'the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations.' 5 9 It didn't have to. By the time
Chief Justice Burger wrote these words in 1981, the Court had provided
numerous indications of the scope of that power. In a series of opinions
stretching almost half a century, the Court indicated that Curtiss-Wright's
"sole organ" possesses inherent as well as implied powers, largely unchecked, which provide the president with independent authority to control
the complex and challenging realm of national security affairs by determining the policy that he deems most effective.'
52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
53. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
54. Id. at 556-57.
55. Id. at 557.
56. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
57. Id. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
58. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
59. Id. at 289 n.17 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319-20 (1936)).
60. The "sole organ" concept has maintained its vitality among a number of members
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This line of precedent suggests that in the formulation of national
security policy, the Constitution, which theoretically offers the most
compelling guidance on the proper allocation of governmental power, can
be ignored. According to this line of precedent, maintaining fidelity to the
text of an eighteenth century document is of secondary importance to effectively managing the problems associated with being a superpower in the
twentieth century. In order to achieve this level of effectiveness, it was
necessary for the Court to make the president the beneficiary of power far
beyond that set forth in Article II. Curtiss-Wright and its progeny represent
the Court's conclusion that in the realm of national security affairs, policy
product is more important than the policy process, as defined in the
Constitution and by the separation of powers.
While the Court was transforming a reference to Curtiss-Wright's "sole
organ" language into authority for a presidency which largely transcended
checks and balances, it was developing an alternative, less startling but
equally effective, strategy for putting Justice Sutherland's ideas to work.

of the current Court. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), Justice Scalia wrote a dissent
in which he argued in favor of the constitutionality of the firing of a CIA technician who
publicly acknowledged his homosexuality. In justifying his position Justice Scalia referred
to the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations" as presented in Curtiss-Wright. Id.
at 614-15 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
Justice O'Connor also dissented in part in Webster and provided an indication of just how
far she would go in interpreting Curtiss-Wright. In arguing in favor of the discharge of the
homosexual CIA employee, Justice O'Connor looked to Curtiss-Wright as justification for
her contention that:
the functions performed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of Central Intelligence lie at the core of 'the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.' The authority of the Director
of Central Intelligence to control access to sensitive national security
information by discharging employees deemed to be untrustworthy flows
primarily from this constitutional power of the President ....
Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted). It is somewhat surprising to observe the willingness of
Justice O'Connor, as well as Justice Scalia, to sanction this intrusion upon individual liberties
based on Curtiss-Wright's vision of the president as "sole organ." Historically if a
government action even remotely jeopardized individual liberties, the Court would attempt
to bolster the credibility of the government action by looking to Curtiss-Wright as a
precedent for the Congress and president to act in tandem. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation of members of the Communist Party); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (prosecution of members of Communist Party of the United
States); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (wartime detention of loyal American
citizen of Japanese descent); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (imposition of death penalty
upon spies).
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B. "FAITHFUL" EXECUTION OF THE LAW

A second passage from Justice Sutherland's opinion might ultimately
have even more impact, given the resurgence of Congress in the 1970s. 6,
The Justice wrote:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment--perhaps serious embarrassment--is to be
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.62
For a number of years this language was interpreted as authority for a broad
delegation of congressional power to the president in the field of foreign
affairs. Over the years it has gradually evolved into authority for the president to be granted extraordinary discretion in the interpretation and
execution of any law dealing with the realm of foreign affairs, regardless of
whether it involves a delegation of congressional power. This authority ultimately allows the president to use the implementation phase to restructure
policy to suit his particular predilections.
In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, a reawakened Congress
subjected the president to a barrage of legislation, such as the War Powers
Act, the Case Act, and the Cooper-Church Amendment. Laws were enacted
in order to limit the president in virtually every aspect of his conduct of
military and national security policy. It was in this environment that the
Court began to use Curtiss-Wright as the means by which the president
could slip the bonds of this legislative onslaught.
One of the first opportunities the Court had to address the president's
61. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS (1981).

62. Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 320. Justice Stevens cited this language in his opinion
for the Court in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607, 684
(1980). However, certain commentators have expressed reservations about the wisdom of
this passage. Dismissing Sutherland's argument that the president should be given extensive
power to avoid "embarrassment" in the conduct of our foreign relations, Glennon writes:
In international law, as well as in these frequently non-justiciable stretches
of constitutional terrain, embarrassment is the principal, and sometimes the
only, sanction that the law can impose. It often is the central means of
maintaining the integrity of the legal system, of preserving the rule of law.
To eliminate embarrassment is to eliminate the rule of law. A President
who violates the law should be embarrassed.
Glennon, supra note 22, at 27.
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obligation to execute these laws was Haig v. Agee.63 In Haig, the Carter
Administration interpreted the Passport Act, which authorized the Secretary
of State to grant and issue passports, as authority for the revocation of a
passport as well.'
Pursuant to this interpretation, the administration
revoked the passport of Philip Agee, an ex-CIA agent who was divulging
classified information, with disastrous and deadly consequences. 65 Chief
Justice Burger, in his opinion for the Court, looked to Curtiss-Wright to
sanction presidential "measures to
protect the secrecy of our Government's
66
operations."
intelligence
foreign
The Court, rather than employing Curtiss-Wright to rule that the
president had this power regardless of what the Passport Act allowed, took
a different approach. The Court simply upheld the president's interpretation
of the Passport Act. 67 And while the Court's approach would, at first
glance, seem to be something of a defeat for the president, in fact the Court
63. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
64. Id. at 286.
65. Id. at 284-86.
66. Id. at 307-08. This was not the first time that Curtiss-Wright was used to sanction
presidential secrecy. See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 551
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a public office
whose occupant would be more dependent upon the ... confidentiality of the instructions
which he gave, for the successful execution of his duties. This is particularly true in the area
of foreign affairs and international relations"); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]f the Constitution gives the
Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have
the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary
to exercise that power successfully"); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948) (stating that "[tihe President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports neither
are nor ought to be published to the world").
Justice O'Connor's assertion in Webster that "the functions performed" by the CIA
"lie at the core of the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as sole
organ" takes Curtiss-Wright to new heights as a precedent. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
605-06 (1987). Under Justice O'Connor's standard, intelligence gathering and analysis, as
well as covert operations, would find constitutional sanctuary in Curtiss-Wright's "exclusive
power of the President." Also of interest is her belief that Curtiss-Wright provided the
authority for the DCI "to control access to sensitive national security information," by
eliminating employees whose sexual preferences pose a security risk. Id. If the president,
acting through his DCI, can do this, it is reasonable to ask what else he can do under
O'Connor's standard. Given all the many ways the DCI could "control access to sensitive
national security information," Justice O'Connor's opinion could be interpreted as an
endorsement of Curtiss-Wright as a precedent for a level of secrecy beyond anything ever
approved by the Supreme Court.
67. Haig, 453 U.S. at 306.
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was taking the first step toward providing the president with an extraordinary weapon in dealing with Congress.
Although the Court chose not to define the precise scope of the
president's power as "sole organ," it used that very "sole organ" language
from Curtiss-Wrightto uphold a presidential interpretation of the law, which
allowed the president to accomplish an objective not authorized by the
law. 68 Curtiss-Wright was cited as authority for the administration's
interpretation of the Passport Act, given "the volatile nature of problems
confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national defense., 69 By
allowing the president the discretion to finesse those laws which pose an
obstacle to his objectives based on the volatility of the problems he
encounters, the Court was using Curtiss-Wrightto establish a precedent that
would allow the president to remain the dominant force in determining the
direction of national security affairs in spite of the congressional resurgence
of the 1970s, or any era.
This precedent would be further strengthened in Regan v. Wald,7° in
which the Court upheld the Reagan Administration's ban on travel to
Cuba. 71 The ban was challenged as inconsistent with the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 72 The IEEPA 73 was enacted
to replace the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 4 which had come
under criticism for giving the president too much power. However,
regulations promulgated under TWEA were to remain effective through a
grandfather clause in IEEPA. The administration based its ban on a
grandfathered regulation that prohibited any transaction involving property
in which Cuba has any interest of any nature. 7' The administration inter68. Id. at 291.
69. Id. Justice Kennedy has expressed a similar concern in his application of CurtissWright. In another case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search of a
residence in Mexico by DEA agents. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990). The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment had no applicability to a citizen of
another country on his native soil. Id. While Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court on the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment, his decision to uphold the search was not limited to
that justification. Justice Kennedy also looked to the power of the president. In a concurring
opinion, he singled out Curtiss-Wright,and argued the previous decisions of the Court "stand
for the proposition that we must interpret constitutional protections in light of the undoubted
power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority
abroad." Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
70. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
71. Id. at 244.
72. Id. at 230.
73. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
74. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988).
75. Regan, 468 U.S. at 229.
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preted this regulation as authorizing a ban on travel to Cuba.76 The only
problem was that at the time of the passage of IEEPA, another regulation
specifically allowed travel to Cuba." The answer was to link travel to
Cuba with property transactions in which Cuba has an interest, which could
be prohibited under the grandfather clause.78
A bitterly divided Supreme Court upheld the president's interpretation, 79 with the dissent offering severe criticism of the majority's interpretation of the statute and reading of the legislative history." Nevertheless, the
Court ruled "there is an adequate basis . . . to sustain the President's
decision to curtail the flow of hard currency to Cuba--currency that could
then be used in support of Cuban adventurism--by restricting travel."8'
Curtiss-Wrightwas cited by the Court in upholding the Reagan Administration's interpretation of the IEEPA, "[gliven the traditional deference to
executive judgment in this vast external realm." 82 Deference to executive
judgment in this particular case meant taking a law intended to decrease
presidential power and twisting it to allow an extraordinary exercise of
power. In Regan, Curtiss-Wright was used to establish a precedent of
presidential interpretation and enforcement of the law, not necessarily in a
manner consistent with the intent of Congress, but in the manner most
conducive to the president's policy objectives.
This precedent would continue to develop in the 1990s. At issue in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council8 3 was Executive Order No. 12,807, which
called for the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting Haitians
to the United States in international waters and return them to Haiti without
the benefit of a hearing." This policy was challenged as a violation of
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, which provided that "[tihe
Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country."8

. The Court rejected this challenge. It ruled that the Act would be
applicable to decisions to deport an alien already in the country, but was
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 244-62 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 243.
Id.
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
Id. at 2552.
Id. at 2552 n.2.
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inapplicable to those who had yet to reach the territorial waters of the
United States.86 Congress did not intend for the Act to have extraterritorial
applicability. While the majority opinion of Justice Stevens indicated that
Congress might possibly limit the president's options by statute, it had not
done so in this case.
In a decision that offered the president the flexibility to maneuver
within the legislative mine field, the Court stated that a statute must "clearly
87
prohibit" a presidential action in order for that option to be foreclosed.
This requirement of extraordinary statutory clarity will have "special force
when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility." 88 The authority Stevens cited for the president's "unique authority"89
and the requirement of clear statutory prohibition was Curtiss-Wright.
Sale represented a tremendous victory for the president's ability to execute
the law in whatever manner the president desires, since it is practically
impossible for Congress to "clearly prohibit" anything by statute. 9°
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court became more subtle, but
no less effective, in its use of Curtiss-Wright to uphold the president's
86. Id. at 2567.
87. Id. at 2567.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2576-77. A dissent by Justice Blackmun shed considerable light upon the
extent of the presidential victory in Sale. Blackmun contended that the Court's interpretation
of the statute was wrong and its use of Curtiss-Wright was dangerous. Blackmun wrote:
In this case we deal with a statute that regulates a distinctively international
subject matter: immigration, nationalities, and refugees .... There is no

danger that the Congress that enacted the Refugee Act was blind to the fact
that the laws it was crafting had implications beyond this Nation's borders
.... The presumption that Congress did not intend to legislate extraterritorially has less force--perhaps, indeed, no force at all--when a statute on its
face relates to foreign affairs.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2576-77 (1993). In Justice Blackmun's
eyes the Court upheld the president's executive order based upon a flawed interpretation of
the Act.
Even more bothersome to Blackmun was the Court's use of Curtiss-Wright as
justification for its interpretation. Blackmun argued, "What the majority appears to be getting
at, as its citation to United States v. Curtiss-Wright ...suggests is that in some areas, the
President, and not Congress, has sole constitutional authority. Immigration is decidedly not
one of those areas." Id. at 2577. Blackmun regarded the interpretation of Curtiss-Wright as
giving the president sole authority in any area as bad enough. Even worse was that the
majority viewed Curtiss-Wright as giving the president the authority, in conducting this
nation's national security affairs, to initiate and execute policy initiatives in areas in which
congressional authority had heretofore been considered clear.
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primacy in the conduct of national security policy. 9 Curtiss-Wright took
on a new form, no longer used as justification for grandiose, sweeping
statements of presidential dominance of the national security process. After
executive branch misadventures and abuses of power of the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, the public, and therefore Congress, insisted upon a greater
congressional role in the policy making process. The old strategy of simply
citing Curtiss-Wright as authority for presidential preeminence would
antagonize the forces of change and make the Court look hopelessly out of
touch.
Therefore the Court began to use Curtiss-Wright in a much more
refined manner, always paying due regard to the importance of the Congress
in the policy making process. Never was a law which embodied a
congressional attempt to insert itself into national security affairs declared
unconstitutional by the Court as an unacceptable intrusion upon the
prerogatives of the president.
And yet, during this period, never was a presidential interpretation of
these laws declared unconstitutional. In fact, the Court invariably upheld the
actions of the president.92 And, almost inevitably, the Court looked to
Curtiss-Wrightto uphold those actions, not as authority for the president to
act without regard for the separation of powers, but as justification for the
president to prevail when his interpretation of an act of Congress was
questioned. Curtiss-Wright would not necessarily mean that the president
would be free to ignore the rules of the game, but that the rules would be
interpreted in a manner that assured that the president would emerge
victorious.
Even as the Court signaled its acceptance of this new vision of national
security policy making, it was relying on many of the same principles and
considerations from Curtiss-Wright and its progeny that implied that this
was the exclusive domain of the president. Decades ago, the Court cited
Curtiss-Wright to justify "the executive power to control the foreign affairs
of the nation 9 3 so as to achieve "[e]ffectiveness in handling the delicate
problems of foreign relations. 9 4 Even after the congressional resurgence
of the 1970s, the Court looked to Curtiss-Wright to justify "deference to
executive judgment"95 when the issue involves "foreign and military affairs

91. See supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.

92. See, e.g., Sale, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Regan, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Haig, 453

U.S. 280 (1981); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981),
93. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
94. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
95. Regan, 468 U.S. at 243.
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for which the President has unique responsibility,' given "the volatile
nature of problems confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national
defense."97
Thus, the Court has used this repackaged version of Curtiss-Wright to
support the same bottom line put forth in those earlier cases: the necessity
of a strong president who dominates the national security process. And
while the Court indicated an intention to interpret Curtiss-Wright as
requiring a process in which national security policy is formulated by both
the president and Congress, the Court has actually demonstrated a willingness to allow policy to be reformulated by the president during the stage of
implementation.
Since Justice Sutherland wrote his opinion in 1936, this nation has
witnessed numerous presidential wars; some open, many covert. We have
seen the development of awesome weapons capable of destroying the planet.
We have lived through countless scandals in which presidents have shown98
of wisdom.
themselves to possess flawed judgment and a profound lack
We have learned firsthand that many presidents can not be trusted with
absolute power. Maybe a return to Sutherland's "sole organ" is impossible,
given all we have been through in the decades since. Yet, the Court still
sees the need for extraordinary vigor in the Executive.
Thus Curtiss-Wright survives as a precedent for presidential power; if
not a precedent for absolute power, then at least for the most powerful
president that our system will allow. If Curtiss-Wright can no longer be
cited as justification for making the national security policy making process
the exclusive domain of the president, then it can be used to insure that the
president is the preeminent actor and that absent the most compelling of
circumstances, the president's policy preferences will ultimately prevail.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the best way to conclude is to distinguish the vision of national
security policy making presented in Curtiss-Wright and that offered by

96. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567.
97. Haig, 453 U.S. at 291.
98. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. COHEN

& GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL: A CANDID

INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS

(1988);

JANE MAYER

&

DOYLE MCMANUS,

LANDSLIDE: THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1984-1988 (1988); THEODORE H. WHITE,
BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1975); CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE
BRIGHTEST (1972).
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Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer.9 The Steel Seizure Case, as it
came to be known, probably represents the virtual antithesis of CurtissWright. In Youngstown, the Court held unconstitutional President Truman's
seizure of the nation's steel mills in the wake of a steel worker strike during
the Korean War."
Justice Black's opinion for the court rejected Truman's contention that the president possessed inherent power to take
virtually any measure on American soil necessary to ensure the success of
the war effort. °'
However, the Steel Seizure Case is probably best remembered for
Justice Robert Jackson's influential concurrence. Jackson, one of the
Court's most vehement critics of Curtiss-Wright, argued that the power
possessed by the president would fluctuate, and be shaped by the actions of
Congress. 2 Jackson put forth the following:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in
these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth), to
personify the federal sovereignty.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. 0 3
99. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

100. Id. at 589.
101. Id. at 585-86.
102. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring). In upholding President Carter's authority
to freeze Iranian assets in response to the taking of American citizens hostage, Rehnquist
cited approvingly Justice Jackson's test. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
By looking to Justice Jackson's extremely critical concurrence and noting that it "brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area," Id. at
661. Justice Rehnquist, at first glance, seemed to reject Curtiss-Wright. This would have
been surprising, given Justice Rehnquist's use of Curtiss-Wright throughout the 1970s. It
was he who cited Curtiss-Wright in Banco de Cuba as indicative of "the primacy of the
executive in the conduct of foreign relations." First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
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Curtiss-Wright, and the cases interpreting it throughout the years, can be
combined to create an interesting, and some would suggest a disturbing,
variation on Justice Jackson's famous three-pronged test from Youngstown.
Obviously, Jackson was correct in stating that when the president acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, authority is at
its maximum. And, as demonstrated in recent years, in order to ensure that
the president will enjoy this maximum authority, the Court may invoke
Curtiss-Wrightas justification to interpret virtually any congressional action
in such a way as to provide this kind of authorization. However, it must be
recalled that such an authorization, while certainly nice to have, is not
absolutely necessary. The Court indicated in Mazurie and American
Petroleum that congressional authorization is largely superfluous, since
Curtiss-Wright indicates that the president "possesses independent authority
over the subject matter" of international relations." °4
When the president acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, the president's independent power can be relied upon,
which is considerable, since it includes not only the powers enumerated in
Article II, but also those inherent powers which spring from our sovereign
status, as articulated by Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright.'0 5 Belmont
interpreted Curtiss-Wright to mean that these inherent powers may even
allow the president to circumvent the constitutionally prescribed process for
conducting national security policy." 6 According to the Court in Pink,

Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766-67 (1972). In Mazurie, it was Justice Rehnquist who cited CurtissWright as a case in which the president possessed independent authority over foreign affairs.
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975). And, in his dissent in Nixon v.
GSA, Curtiss-Wright was cited extensively as authority for the secrecy of presidential
communications. Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 551 (1971).
A harder look reveals that Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dames & Moore
was not a repudiation of the vision of presidential power presented by Curtiss-Wright.
Rehnquist went to great lengths to stress that the Court was not making a major change in
its interpretation of presidential power: "We attempt to lay down no general 'guidelines'
covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the
very questions necessary to the decision of the case." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661.
Even though Jackson's concurrence was cited approvingly in Dames & Moore, Rehnquist
was not ready to abandon Curtiss-Wright as a precedent. He demonstrated this quite clearly
three years later by relying on Curtiss-Wright in his majority opinion in Regan v. Wald,
upholding the Reagan Administration's controversial interpretation of the TWEA and IEEPA.
If Rehnquist had truly repudiated Curtiss-Wright, Regan would have offered the perfect
opportunity to uphold the administration's action based on Jackson's theory. Instead,
Rehnquist chose to employ Curtiss-Wright.
104. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 556-57.
105. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317-18.
106. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32.
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Curtiss-Wright justifies the contention that the president also possesses a
reservoir of implied power, necessary for "effectiveness in handling the
delicate problems of foreign relations," which includes the prerogative "to
determine" the policy that will be pursued by the government. 0 7 In this
zone of twilight in which the president and Congress have concurrent
authority, the president will prevail, since Curtiss-Wright stands for the
proposition that the Constitution must be interpreted "in light of the
undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate
08
power and authority abroad."'
When the president takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, the president may still prevail. The president
should look for loopholes in the policies as articulated by Congress and
exploit them. Curtiss-Wrightdictates that the president must be given some
room to navigate among obstacles posed by Congress, given "the volatile
nature of problems confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national
defense."' ° Where no loopholes exist, the president should interpret the
law in the manner that best suits the policy preferences of the presidency,
while publicly grounding the actions in adherence to the very law being
sought to circumvent. Regan v. Wald demonstrates that Curtiss-Wrightmay
be used to uphold even a disingenuous interpretation of the law, based on
the deference traditionally accorded the president's predecessors. Sale
teaches that because of the president's "unique responsibility" in this area,
as identified by Curtiss-Wright,only where Congress has clearly prohibited
an option will that option be foreclosed." 0 Since Congress rarely musters
this kind of statutory clarity, the president's policy preferences are likely to
prevail.
Of course, Curtiss-Wright does not guarantee a powerful president. It
does not guarantee that President Clinton will continue to fight Congress on
our policy toward Bosnia, nor that he will ultimately succeed. A president
must make the choice to exercise discretionary power, and then must
marshall the political forces necessary to win in a clash with Congress.
However, for the 'president who seeks to exercise the courage of his or her
convictions, Curtiss-Wright and its progeny offer judicial endorsement of a
preeminent presidential role, encouragement for the president to push the
boundaries of power, and legitimacy for presidential initiatives that are
challenged in our courts.
It was Justice Sutherland's contention that his decision had its roots in
107. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
108. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990).
109. Haig, 453 U.S. at 291.
110. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2567.

19961

THE REALITY OF CURTISS-WRIGHT

the eighteenth century, but the development of Curtiss-Wrightis very much
the product of the twentieth century. It is a decision which has survived the
ebb and flow of national as well as international events, handed down
during a time of isolationism, blossoming throughout World War II and the
Cold War era, and surviving even the post-Vietnam congressional resurgence
of the 1970s. It is a decision that has been used to uphold the actions of
presidents ranging from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan, from Richard
Nixon to Bill Clinton. It is a decision that has been used to sanction a wide
range of presidential initiatives, regardless of whether the president and
Congress were partners or antagonists, whether Congress was dormant or
resurgent. It is a decision that is incredibly flexible, constantly evolving to
fit the factual context of the specific case, the particular principle which the
Court seeks to emphasize, and the circumstances in which the Court hands
down its ruling. Finally, it is a decision which, despite the objections of
critics, can be used to resolve almost any constitutional controversy, from
limited questions of enforcement of the law to broad issues of control of
national security policy, in favor of the president. Those who see only the
personal diatribe of Justice George Sutherland would do well to remember
this.

